{"id":826,"date":"2007-06-30T12:51:57","date_gmt":"2007-06-30T20:51:57","guid":{"rendered":"\/?p=826"},"modified":"2007-06-30T13:46:27","modified_gmt":"2007-06-30T21:46:27","slug":"including-the-whole-spectrum-of-use-cases","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/?p=826","title":{"rendered":"Including the whole spectrum of use cases"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Mathew Martin, who writes <a href=\"http:\/\/suburbandestiny.com\/tech\/\" class=\"broken_link\">Mostly Mr. SQL<\/a>,&nbsp;clearly&nbsp;detests PKI certificates more than almost any living person.&nbsp; He finds CardSpace guilty by association in a piece called <a href=\"http:\/\/suburbandestiny.com\/tech\/?p=243\" class=\"broken_link\">GRRRR!&nbsp; CardSpace.&nbsp; What a useless steeming pile&#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Ok. Cardspace\/Infocard is like OpenId.&nbsp; Password-less access to websites&nbsp;(or password-fewer access).<\/p>\n<p><strong>BUT <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.leastprivilege.com\/CardSpaceAndDecryptingTokens.aspx\" class=\"broken_link\">You must use SSL<\/a>.&nbsp; Even if you just want to secure your application against your clueless neighbor.&nbsp; That is a minimum of $40.<\/p>\n<p>2. <a href=\"http:\/\/developers.de\/blogs\/damir_dobric\/archive\/2007\/06\/19\/keyset-not-found-error.aspx\">You must decrypt the response on an account with NTFS access to the private key<\/a>.&nbsp; The NT Network Service account is not likely to have&nbsp;read access to the&nbsp;private key&nbsp;on a hosted account.&nbsp; Good luck explain how and getting co-operation from your hosting provider.<\/p>\n<p>3. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.leastprivilege.com\/DecryptingCardSpaceTokensInPartialTrust.aspx\" class=\"broken_link\">Decryption must be done under FULL TRUST<\/a>.&nbsp; Many hosted accounts only let you run in medium trust and don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t let you create COM+ dlls, put stuff in the GAC, etc.<\/p>\n<p>[<a href=\"http:\/\/forums.microsoft.com\/MSDN\/ShowPost.aspx?PostID=1307759&amp;SiteID=1\" class=\"broken_link\">Items 2 and 3 might not even be a good idea<\/a>.&nbsp; If the world at large manages to use your web application to maliciously download your SSL cert, I suppose they could do something evil, like pretend they are you]<\/p>\n<p>4. To get rid of the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153<a href=\"http:\/\/www.aspnetpro.com\/opinion\/2007\/06\/asp200706jg_o\/asp200706jg_o.asp\">the website isn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t secure for banking or ecommerce<\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u009d you have to spend $1000 on an EV SLL cert.&nbsp; Oh, sure, pocket change.<\/p>\n<p>5. And who is issuing managed cards?&nbsp;I can get an SSL based cert from Thawte that says I am the person that controls my email account, but I can\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t find anyone who issues managed infocards anywhere.<\/p>\n<p>I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122ve about realize that I\u00e2\u20ac\u201ca computer profession and programmer, will not be able to implement InfoCard\/Cardspace in any form, not for my blog, not for my hobby website, nothing.&nbsp; Either one has $1040 and ones own entire server or nothing.<\/p>\n<p>If only the top 10 biggest websites can overcome the hurdles posed by infocard, what we are going to see is 5 websites accept infocard and everyone else (mom &amp; pop websites) continue to use passwords and user ID\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s. InfoCard will have a minimal impact on how authentication is done.<\/p>\n<p>This is going to drive small websites into using OpenId.&nbsp; Consumer will rapidly gain a few dozen OpenId cards.&nbsp; The rising ubiquity of OpenId\u00e2\u20ac\u201cwhich doesn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t try to be a waterproof authentication method\u00e2\u20ac\u201cwill take over the world, relegating InfoCard to \u00e2\u20ac\u0153that way you logon to Live.com services\u00e2\u20ac\u009d.<\/p>\n<p>Come on Microsoft, when are we going to be able to run CardSpace\/Info card in \u00e2\u20ac\u0153real world\u00e2\u20ac\u009d mode?<\/p>\n<p>[Thanks to <a href=\"http:\/\/self-issued.info\/?p=17\">Self-issued.info<\/a> for the logo]&nbsp; [Actually, I take that back, it is a Microsoft trademark. The <a href=\"http:\/\/self-issued.info\/infocard_icon\/Information%20Card%20Icon%20Guidelines.pdf\">purple box is has a substantial amount of IP self legislation that goes with it<\/a>.&nbsp; According to MS\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s lawyers, I am currently in violation of usage guide lines for the icon.&nbsp; Let\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s see how Microsoft silences critics of InfoCard.]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Let&#39;s start with the CardSpace requirement&nbsp;that a relying party support&nbsp;SSL.&nbsp;&nbsp;I&nbsp;agree with&nbsp;Mathew that requiring use of SSL and PKI is&nbsp;overkill for the type of&nbsp;blogging and hobbyist use cases&nbsp;he describes.&nbsp;&nbsp;While my identityblog certificate is fairly inexpensive (thanks to godaddy.com), the extra cost&nbsp;associated with&nbsp;it&nbsp;at textdrive (which hosts my system) is&nbsp;around $100.00 per year because of the need to have a dedicated outward facing IP address.&nbsp; I don&#39;t mind the cost too much, since I&nbsp;know there are people&nbsp;who will hit&nbsp;on my site and I like the extra protection.&nbsp; But this really isn&#39;t appropriate for everyone.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>This&nbsp;underlines the fact&nbsp;that identity and the identity metasystem involve a continuum of use cases and technologies &#8211; and&nbsp;we have to embrace the whole continuum.&nbsp;&nbsp;By&nbsp;making certificates mandatory, we cut the continuum in half.&nbsp; Luckily, we can fix that before we get into the wide deployment phase.<\/p>\n<p>My conclusion is that rather than hard-wiring the requirements for identification of a relying party into the identity selector, we should have allowed each identity provider to decide what minimal requirements were appropriate.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>This ends up having advantages both at the low value and high value ends of the spectrum.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>For example, a bank&#39;s IP might decide to only release information to a relying party with an Extended Validation (EV) certificate.&nbsp; If so,&nbsp;CardSpace would not illuminate the associated information card if an EV&nbsp;certificate were not&nbsp;in use&nbsp;at the relying party site.&nbsp;&nbsp; <em>[EV certificates are only granted to companies or other organizations after they follow an extensive procedure for proving their legitimacy.] <\/em><\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, a blogging reputation identity provider might be happy to release reputation to any site the user proposes, certificate or no certificate.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, the relying party is always free to use a certificate and gain the extra protection that provides.<\/p>\n<p>This change is actually&nbsp;part of&nbsp;CardSpace 1.1 &#8211; which people should be able to start experimenting with&nbsp;very soon now.&nbsp; When combined with the release of great toolkits for all the important languages, I think this will bring quite a bit of lift-off.<\/p>\n<p>As for point 4), let&#39;s look at what the CardSpace advisory actually says:<\/p>\n<p><img src=\"\/wp-content\/images\/2007\/06\/cardspace-requirements.jpg\" \/><\/p>\n<p>I think there&#39;s a big difference between &#8220;a major internet business&#8221; and a site doing &#8220;ecommerce&#8221;.&nbsp; When I buy a tee-shirt from Mathew I don&#39;t expect him to be EV.&nbsp; If&nbsp;he were trying to sell thousand dollar cameras, I would feel differently.&nbsp; I&#39;d want him to either be well identified, or to work through a site like eBay that would provide another way of establishing his reputation.&nbsp; And in this case, I want to make sure I&#39;m really talking to eBay, so once again would like to see an EV cert.<\/p>\n<p>I don&#39;t think any &#8220;major internet business&#8221; or bank will have any difficulty whatsoever covering the cost of an EV cert.&nbsp;&nbsp;The idea of&nbsp;using the superior certs came directly from them, since&nbsp;they&#39;re the ones whose users get phished.&nbsp; I don&#39;t understand why, given his <a href=\"http:\/\/suburbandestiny.com\/tech\/?p=240\" class=\"broken_link\">earlier rant <\/a>against the poor validation proceedures in conventional certificates, Mathew rails against&nbsp;our support for EV.&nbsp; Part of his earlier criticism of EV certs is that the browser doesn&#39;t show the meaning of the cert properly, a problem CardSpace has solved. Consider this recent <a href=\"http:\/\/www.antiphishing.org\/reports\/apwg_report_april_2007.pdf\" class=\"broken_link\">Anti-Phishing Working Group <\/a>report:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.antiphishing.org\/reports\/apwg_report_april_2007.pdf\" class=\"broken_link\"><img src=\"\/wp-content\/images\/2007\/06\/apwg.jpg\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>As for who is issuing managed cards,&nbsp;you&#39;ll be seeing&nbsp;many outfits doing it as we move toward the InfoCard tipping point.&nbsp; We&#39;re in the sockets and ecosystem phase of Information Cards, but&nbsp;I can tell you&nbsp;many players get the potential of the technology and are integrating it into product.<\/p>\n<p>As for OpenID versus Information Cards, I don&#39;t see them as opposites.&nbsp; Go to <a href=\"http:\/\/www.signon.com\" class=\"broken_link\">signon.com <\/a>today and you&#39;ll see it supports use of Information Cards for OpenID authentication.&nbsp;&nbsp; This is nice because it gets you InfoCard&nbsp;safety along with OpenID long-tail support.&nbsp;Going forward, I think you&#39;ll see&nbsp;most OpenID&nbsp;vendors supporting OpenID&nbsp;managed&nbsp;cards that work with OpenID sites.<\/p>\n<p>As for the Information Card Icon, our intention is that it be available to everyone who supports the technology.&nbsp; There has been pushback on the language around the icon, and we&#39;ll be figuring out how we can get this thing right.&nbsp; In the meantime, I wouldn&#39;t be worried about using it on a teeshirt or to criticise us &#8211; but I would&nbsp;be worried about using it at a phishing site.&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>I agree with Mathew that requiring use of SSL and PKI is overkill for the type of blogging and hobbyist use cases he describes. This is fixed in CardSpace 1.1<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":68,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[8,15,22,23,4],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/826"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/68"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=826"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/826\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=826"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=826"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.identityblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=826"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}